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Consolidating Space: A Proposal to
Establish a Central Forum for the
Settlement of Space-Related Disputes
ABSTRACT

Over sixty years have passed since the Soviet Union launched
Sputnik 1 into Earth'sorbit. In that time, humanity's presence in space
has flourished as technology advanced and new actors entered the scene.
Despite this progress, the regime upon which the world relies to resolve
space disputes has hardly changed in the fifty years of its existence. As
private enterprise floods into the final frontier, how humanity will
resolve the inevitable, extraterrestrialdisputes is becoming a pressing
concern.
The Outer Space Treaty establishes three fundamentalprinciples
of space law: (1) space is sovereignless, (2) space exploration and use
must be collaborative, and (3) the use of space must benefit all
humankind. Although individuals have access to a variety of forums for
the resolution of space-related disputes, these forums each possess
strengths and weaknesses in light of the fundamental principles of
international space law. Therefore, to promote the sovereignless and
cooperative resolution of outer space disputes, preserving the ability of
all states to access outer space, this Note proposes that a three-pronged
Global Space Organization be established to settle disputes, centralize
collaboration,and ensure the sharing of research and discovery.
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In September 2016, SpaceX CEO Elon Musk famously laid out
the company's plans to colonize Mars during his lifetime.' Like many of
Musk's tweets and statements regarding outer space, including the

1.
See Rebecca Hersher & Camila Domonoske, Elon Musk Unveils His Plan for
Colonizing Mars, NPR (Sept. 27, 2016, 12:30 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/20 16/09/27/495622695/this-afternoon-elon-musk-unveils-his-plan-for-colonizing-mars
[https://perma.cc/HE5L-YWRP].
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potential for artificial sunS 2 and nuclear-induced climate change, 3 the
timeline for colonization of Mars generates equal parts skepticism and
fervor for humanity's future in space.4 However, Musk and SpaceX
could be at risk of losing a future Mars settlement if Dr. Philip Davies's
legal claim to ownership of the red planet possesses merit.5 Regardless
of merit, the value of this potential dispute is not in who succeeds but
in where and how it will be resolved.
Beginning in 2010, Dr. Davies and his team have attempted to
establish ownership of Mars by beaming quadrillions of photons toward
Mars in an attempt to manipulate the planet's atmosphere.6 Using a
series of high-powered blue and red lasers to add heat, the light
particles potentially created a nonzero effect on the atmosphere and
surface of Mars-a change that Dr. Davies believes is integral to his
claim on the planet.7 A quick foray into Dr. Davies's website presents
an intriguing claim of ownership based on the theory of effective
occupation, an international corollary of the private law theory of
adverse possession.8 However, Dr. Davies's claim to Mars is not a
self-serving attempt in acquiring Martian real estate; instead Dr.
Davies's ultimate goal is the revision of the 1967 Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the "Outer
Space Treaty"). 9
Regardless of Dr. Davies's altruistic motives, this Note is
impartial to the outcome of such a dispute. Instead, this Note focuses
2.
See Elon Musk (@elonmusk), TWITTER (July 30, 2018, 8:39 PM), https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/102413757046305 1778?lang=en [https://perma.cc/EDF4-L9RB].
3.
See The Late Show with Stephen Colbert, Elon Musk Might Be a Super
Villain, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 10,
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gV6hP9wpMW8
[https://perma.cc/2HJZ-UTF4].
4.
Compare Alan Boyle, Reality Check: Elon Musk's Mars Plan Will Cost
More, Take Longer. What Else Is New?, GEEKWIRE (Sept. 28, 2016, 4:04 PM),
https://www.geekwire.com/2016/reality-check-elon-musk-mars-plan/
[https://perma.cc/6QJPQV96], with Neel V. Patel, How Elon Musk's Plan to Colonize Mars Helps Planet Earth, OBSERVER
(Apr. 22, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://observer.com/2018/04/why-elon-musk-and-spacex-aim-to-colonize-mars/ [https://perma.cc/4SZ3-EVXW].
See Simon Parkin, The Man Who Would Sell You Mars, How WE GET TO NEXT (July
5.
26,
2016),
https://howwegettonext.com/the-man-who-would-sell-you-mars-9d870561dlc6
[https://perma.cc/ATD6-ZFEP].
See Overview: A Quick Walk Through, MARS FOR SALE, http://mars.sale/overview/
6.
[https://perma.cc/KT37-ZNL2] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
7.
See Home, MARS FOR SALE, http://mars.sale/ [https://perma.cc/V9AG-XWC4] (last
visited Jan. 21, 2020).
8.
See Overview: A Quick Walk Through, supra note 6.
9.
See Home, supra note 7; see also Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
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on the procedures and mechanisms that can provide the necessary
forum for the resolution of this dispute and the multitude of others
likely to emerge in the latest wave of space exploration. Under the
current space law regime, outer space has been a field dominated by
state actors,10 an issue acknowledged by Dr. Davies among the many
legal questions surrounding his claim." However, the Outer Space
Treaty forbids state acquisition of celestial bodies. 12 Without
sovereignty over Martian land, the United Kingdom, and, by extension,
British courts, should not serve as the appropriate forum for settling
this dispute. 13
Therefore, Dr. Davies, without the resources of the domestic
legal regime, would likely be forced to seek international resolution.
However, because Dr. Davies is an individual, not a state, his private,
property claim cannot be brought before an international court such as
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) without first being espoused by
the United Kingdom. 14 As the United Kingdom is unlikely to espouse
his property claim to a celestial body, it appears that Dr. Davies may be
out of luck. While Dr. Davies's laser terraforming may seem like science
fiction, humanity's ever-growing space presence heightens the need for
a centralized system for the resolution of space-related disputes.
Even putting aside the highly theoretical field of interplanetary
colonization, significant strides have been made in human space
exploration over the last half decade. Most recently, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) detailed plans to land
the first woman and next man on the lunar surface by the year 2024,
complying with White House Space Policy Directive 1, an integrated
private- and public-sector program to return humans to the moon and,
eventually, Mars. 15 In January 2019, the Chinese space program landed
10.
See P.J. Blount, Renovating Space: The Future of InternationalSpace Law, 40 DENV.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 515, 521-23 (2001).
11.
See
Legal
Matters,
MARS
FOR
SALE,
http://mars.sale/legal-issues/
[https://perma.cc/2CTE-6KFZ] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
12.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
13.
See id. For a concise analysis of jurisdiction, see George Paul Sloup, Peaceful
Resolution of Outer Space Conflicts Through the InternationalCourt of Justice: "The Line of Least
Resistance", 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 618, 635-53 (1971).
14.
See U.N. Charter and Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34(1), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]; Legal Matters, supra note 11. Dr. Davies claims that
England may espouse his claim because the Outer Space Treaty does not explicitly prohibit claims
by individuals. While this is a potential interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty, it would need to
be analyzed in light of the custom and practice that surrounds the laws of outer space. See Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. II; Legal Matters, supra note 11.
15.
See Press Release, NASA, New Space Policy Directive Calls for Human Expansion
Across Solar System (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/new-space-policy-directive-calls-for-human-expansion-across-solar-system [https://perma.cc/DXW5-STZQ]; Amanda
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a rover on the far side of the moon, becoming the first state to capture
close-range images of the far side of the moon. 16 In June 2018, the
Japanese Hayabusa2 mission became the first to safely land a rover on
the surface of an asteroid, an instrumental development in the future
of space resource mining.17 Recent legislation by the United States and
Luxembourg gives private companies ownership rights of mineral
resources harvested from celestial bodies, opening the door to private
space mining.18 With each advancement in space technology and
experience, human ability in space grows, but so too does the potential
for space-related disputes not yet governed by the current international
space law regime.
This Note examines the confusing variety of mechanisms
available to both states and private parties in resolving space-related
disputes and proposes a hybrid body dedicated to the establishment and
refinement of international space law and practice. Part I analyzes the
legal regime governing space, with particular emphasis on the three
fundamental principles of space law. Part II addresses a variety of
modern forums for the resolution of space disputes. Part III proposes a
hybrid three-part Global Space Organization, which would provide a
forum for international collaboration, a means for dispute resolution,
and an information-sharing mechanism. In conclusion, the variety of
opportunity in space will continue to capture the human imagination,
and with additional use will come conflict. By centralizing space-related
dispute resolution as well as the regulation of future space use, a
consistent scheme of practice will emerge to facilitate expansion and
protect the interests of humankind.

Jackson & Chris Boyette, NASA Plans to Land the First Woman on the Moon by 2024, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/13/us/nasa-moon-2024-trnd-sen/index.html [https://perma.cc/QQT5BYCQ] (last updated June 17, 2019, 4:03 PM).
16.
See Matt Rivers, Helen Regan & Steven Jiang, China Lunar Rover Touches
Down on Far Side of the Moon,
State Media Announce,
CNN: HEALTH,
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/02/health/china-lunar-rover-far-moon-landing-intl/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6X6L-MJHX] (last updated Jan. 4, 2019, 1:49 AM); Connor Simpson, China
Becomes Third Country to Ever 'Soft-Land' on the Moon, ATLANTIC (Dec. 14, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/china-becomes-third-country-eversoft-land-moon/356151/ [https://perma.cc/L2LR-WBNV].
See Kristin Houser, A Pair of Japanese Robots (Hopefully) Just Landed on an
17.
Asteroid, FUTURISM (Sept. 21, 2018), https://futurism.com/the-byte/hayabusa2-japan-asteroid
[https://perma.cc/KA3B-LAQR]; Matthew Taylor, Hayabusa2: Japanese Robots Land on Moving
Asteroid in World First, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/science/20 18/sep/23/hayabusa2-j apanese-robots-land-on-moving-asteroid-in-world-first
[https://perma.cc/7QSW-QA8T].
18.
See Ashley Hamer, Two CountriesHave Made Space Mining Legal. But Is That, Well,
Legal?, CURIOSITY (July 22, 2017), https://curiosity.com/topics/two-countries-have-made-spacemining-legal-but-is-that-well-legal-curiosity/ [https://perma.cc/ENF8-4NEJ].
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I. THE MODERN SPACE REGIME

Like other fields of international law, space law consists of
multiple elements, each shaping the actions and consequences of
states.19 For the purpose of this analysis, this Part discusses the
international treaty regime concerning outer space, as well as the
domestic practice of states. This Part details the history and context
surrounding the Outer Space Treaty and the subsequent multilateral
agreements that emerged from the first Outer Space Treaty, and it
highlights important developments in recent domestic laws that impact
the future of space exploration and use.
A. InternationalSpace Treaty Law
This discussion of the treaties that comprise the international
space regime begins with the creation of the Outer Space Treaty. 20
Though not the first documentation of general principles of
international space law, the Outer Space Treaty represents the first
formal agreement between states on the fundamental norms of
behavior with respect to the exploration and use of the newly accessible
realm of outer space. 2 1 This founding treaty and the subsequent
agreements drafted by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) remain remarkable achievements in
international collaboration during an era of political tension and
mistrust. 22

1. Cold War History and Context
Established amid the Space Race and Cold War tensions, the
Outer Space Treaty consolidated the efforts of forward-thinking legal
scholars and addressed many of the issues now facing the continued
development of human space exploration, including issues of

19.
For an explanation on the various forms of international law, see Joseph W.
Dellapenna, The Forms of InternationalLaw 11-17 (Villanova Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2011-10, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1908277.
20.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
21.
See, e.g., Stephen E. Doyle, A Concise History of Space Law: 1910-2009, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON SPACE LAW: THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 53RD IISL COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE: YOUNG SCHOLAR SESSION 1-8 (Mark J. Sundahl & V. Gopalakrishnan eds., 2011).
22.
For an analysis of the relationship between the United States and Soviet Union during
the Cold War, see Hal Brands, Non-Proliferationand the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The
Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT, 7 COLD WAR HIST. 389 (2007).
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sovereignty, 23 military advantage, 24 liability, 2 5 and use. 2 6 Following the
launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957, the Soviet Union engaged in a decade of
space exploration and use prior to the development of the Outer Space
Treaty. 27 The United States countered with Explorer 1, followed by a
British and Canadian presence in space soon after. 28 Indeed, by the time
the Outer Space Treaty went into effect, humankind had already
established a physical presence in space and greater exploration was
imminent. 29 Despite the successes and achievements of individual
states in space, international concerns over nuclear development,
weaponization of space technology, and the expansion of state power
between the United States and the Soviet Union spurred disagreement
on, and emphasized the need for, the Outer Space Treaty. 30
2. The Outer Space Treaty
In the decades preceding the Outer Space Treaty, the United
States and the Soviet Union established themselves as powerful
international states with the willingness and ability to shape
international law. 31 Fittingly, the two nations played equal parts in the
formation of the Outer Space Treaty, both as active participants in the
Space Race and as codrafters of the treaty. 32 The object of the Outer
23.

See Doyle, supra note 21, at 3.

24.
STEPHEN E. DOYLE, ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION 88-92 (2002).

25.
26.

Id. at 90.
See S. Chandrashekar, Problems of Definition: A View of an Emerging Space Power,

in PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE PREVENTION

OF AN ARMS RACE 77, 81 (Bhupendra Jasani ed., 1991).
27.
See Teasel Muir-Harmony, American Foreign Policy and the Space Race, in OXFORD
RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY (2017).
28.

See HELEN T. WELLS ET AL., ORIGINS OF NASA NAMES 35 (1976); Muir-Harmony,

&

supra note 27.
29.
See, e.g., Cheryl L. Mansfield, 1960s: From Dream to Reality in 10 Years, NASA
(June 29, 2012), https://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/about/history/timeline/60s-decade.html
[https://perma.cc/8FPV-U4DA].
30.
See Lisa M. Schenck & Robert A. Youmans, From Start to Finish:A HistoricalReview
of Nuclear Arms Control Treaties and Starting Over with the New Start, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L
COMP. L. 399, 402-07 (2012); Dallon Adams, InternationalRelationsAre Tense in Orbit. Is Creating
a 'Space Force' a Good Idea?, DIGITAL TRENDS (May 1, 2018, 2:51 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/weaponized-satellites-and-the-cold-war-in-space/
[https://perma.cc/UA5ZB6SF].
31.
See Mohd. Noor Mat Yazid, The Cold War, Bipolarity Structureand the Power Vacuum
in the East and South East Asia After 1945, 2 J. GLOBAL PEACE & CONFLICT 121, 121-28 (2014).
32.
See Muir-Harmony, supra note 27; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
U.S. DEP'T ST., https://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm [https://perma.cc/Y5QN-XCA4] (last visited
Jan. 21, 2020) [hereinafter OST Narrative].
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Space Treaty was to consolidate previous efforts to create space law and
reform it in a binding multilateral agreement. 33 As such, the new treaty
utilized material previously agreed upon in UN resolutions-in
particular, the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. 34 Despite
lengthy discussions and last-minute diplomatic overtures, the Outer
Space Treaty was adopted by the UN General Assembly and went into
effect in October 1967. As of January 2020, the Outer Space Treaty is
widely accepted, acquiring 109 state parties. 35 This Section emphasizes
three fundamental principles of the Outer Space Treaty: (1) space is a
sovereign free realm, (2) the exploration of space requires international
collaboration, and (3) the use of space must benefit all humankind. 36
a. Principleof Sovereignless Space
The free use of outer space has been an integral principle of
international space law since the inception of early aerospace laws. 37
Following the end of the Second World War and the establishment of
the United Nations, the rapidly globalizing world feared the expansion
of colonialism by the proclaimed global superpowers. 38 The United
Nations, in both its charter and subsequent resolutions, opposed
colonialism and feared that the newly accessible territory of space
would spark a land grab similar to that in Africa during the late 1800s. 39
Thus, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty declares that "Outer
space ... is not subject to national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." 40

33.
See OST Narrative, supra note 32.
34.
G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Dec. 13, 1963).
35.
See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF.,
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer-space [https://perma.cc/R4V5-CHHX] (last visited Jan.
21, 2020).
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
36.
See Doyle, supra note 21, at 2-6.
37.
38.
See Katharine McGregor & Vannessa Hearman, Challenging the Lifeline of
Imperialism: ReassessingAfro-Asian Solidarity and Related Activism in the Decade 1955-1965, in
BANDUNG, GLOBAL HISTORY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL PASTS AND PENDING FUTURES

161, 164 (Luis Eslava et al. eds., 2017).
39.
See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2; G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Dec. 14, 1960); Stelios Michalopoulos & Elias
Papaioannou, The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa, VOX CEPR POL'Y PORTAL (Jan. 6,
2012), https://voxeu.org/article/long-run-effects-scramble-africa [https://perma.cc/CL3D-8DJM].
40.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
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In support of this sovereignless objective, the drafters attempted
to limit weapons in space, recognizing that states may use military force
to acquire and defend sovereign rights over territory in space.4 1 The
consistent advancement in technology and nuclear weaponry during the
period in which the Outer Space Treaty was drafted contributed to
states' concerns with a militarized space. 42 By the early 1960s, the world
saw large developments in nuclear technology and hostilities as the
Soviet Union detonated a fifty-megaton nuclear weapon in 1961 and the
Cuban Missile Crisis reached its head a year later. 43 Though separate
international agreements began the de-escalation of nuclear tensions,
the Outer Space Treaty was significantly impacted by the continued
militarization of nuclear technology, leading to the addition of Article
IV, a prohibition on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction
in space.44
Finally, embedded in the debate on sovereignty in space was the
concern over who should be responsible for space-related missions.4 5
The United States' contingency to the Outer Space Treaty negotiations
supported the role of private exploration, and it believed space was not
limited to state exploration.4 6 The Soviet Union disagreed and was
reluctant to relinquish control of space exploration among private
citizens.4 7 This disagreement led to a compromise, embodied in Article
VI.4 8 Article VI permits the private exploration of space but limits the
activities to those authorized and supervised by the host state.4 9
Additionally, Article VI assigns liability and international
responsibility for damages caused by private ventures to the host

41.
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that nothing in the present
charter shall impair the inherent right of self-defense. U.N. Charter art. 51.
42.
See Loren Grush, How an International Treaty Signed 50 Years Ago Became
the Backbone for Space Law, VERGE (Jan. 27, 2017, 11:14 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/27/14398492/outer-space-treaty-50-anniversary-exploration-guidelines
[https://perma.cc/37N5-P37K].
43.
See Joseph T. Thompson, The Cuban Missile Crisis in Context, INSIGHT: RIVIER
ACAD. J., Spring 2010, at 1, 1-10, https://www2.rivier.edu/journal/ROAJ-Spring-2010/J389Thompson.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W6Z-WKDY]; Tsar Bomba, AToMic HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 8,
2014), https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/tsar-bomba [https://perma.cc/C8PV-DLBP].
44.
See Treaty on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, Russ.-U.S., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. No. 111-5 (2011); see, e.g., Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Sept. 10, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-28 (not in force); Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 9, art. IV.
45.
See Doyle, supra note 21, at 1-7.
46.
See id.
47.
See id.
48.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. VI; Doyle, supra note 21, at 1-7.
49.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. VI.
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state.50 While powers of regulation and oversight consistent with
state-controlled action were conceded, the ability to preserve private
space activities aided in the weakening of a sovereign-dominated space.
b. Principle of InternationalCollaboration
In addition to the principle of a sovereignless space, the Outer
Space Treaty recognizes a need for a collaborative approach to
regulation and exploration in space. 51 Though the Cold War established
an era of mistrust and secrecy, the potentially infinite nature of space
and the differences in technological advancement among spacefaring
states provided an opportunity for international collaboration. 52 The
drafting states established recording and reporting mechanisms that
facilitated the sharing of information and established an obligation to
abide by international law while in space. 53 The preamble recites the
treaty's goal of contributing to broad international cooperation in the
scientific and legal aspects of space exploration.5 4 Likewise, the text of
the treaty guarantees the application of international law in space,
shared research and space missions, and reciprocity in open use of
eventual space-based facilities.55
c. Principleof Benefitting All Humankind
The Outer Space Treaty recognizes in its preamble the belief
"that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the
benefit of all peoples."5 6 Given the disparity between spacefaring and
nonspacefaring nations at the time of drafting, space presented a
potential mechanism for the rich to get richer.5 7 To combat such issues
and preserve space as an international domain for all, Article I of the
Outer Space Treaty delineates specific rights concerning space
exploration and use.5 8 In declaring the exploration and use of space the
50.
See id.
51.
See id.
52.
For a look at the Soviet perspective on atomic secrets, see Oleg A. Bukharin, The Cold
War Atomic Intelligence Game, 1945-70, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (Apr. 14, 2007, 8:14 PM),
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol48no2/article0I.htmI [https://perma.cc/3JWD-3CDY].
53.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
54.
See id.
55.
See id.
56.
See id.
57.
See Tim Fernholz, The US Has Space Experts Worried About an Extra-Terrestrial
Land Grab, QUARTZ (May 22, 2015), https://qz.com/409878/the-us-has-space-experts-worriedabout-an-extra-terrestrial-land-grab/ [https://perma.cc/N3ML-LXRA].
58.
See id.
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"province of all mankind," the treaty's signatories acknowledged that
both should be available: (1) irrespective of economic or scientific
development, (2) without discrimination, and (3) free for scientific
investigation.5 9 However, these acknowledgements did not come
without pushback, and debate exists as to whether the phrase "for the
benefit . . . of all countries" creates legal obligations.60
3. Subsequent Multilateral Space Treaties and Resolutions
a. Binding MultilateralSpace Agreements
Following the successful entry into force of the Outer Space
Treaty, the United Nations and COPUOS initiated four subsequent
agreements to further clarify the body of international space law. 61
Each of the four agreements reinforces or provides a deeper
understanding of the fundamental principles established in the Outer
Space Treaty. However, of the four subsequent agreements, the
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the "Rescue
Agreement") and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Space (the "Registration Convention") do not discuss
adjudication of space disputes. 62 Similarly, the Agreement Governing
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the
"Moon Agreement") provides little guidance on this issue. 63
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects (the "Liability Convention"), however, lies at the core
of international adjudication of space disputes and establishes a

59.
60.

See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
See OGUNSOLA 0. OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 64

(1975).
61.
See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement];
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14,
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention]; Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2391, 961
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19
U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement].
62.
See Registration Convention, supra note 61; Rescue Agreement, supra note 61.
63.
See Moon Agreement, supra note 61. The Moon Agreement, though ratified by
eighteen states, is effectively nonbinding, as no major spacefaring nation has ratified it. Status of
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other CelestialBodies, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=XXIV2&chapter=24&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/HVK2-Q4HQ] (last updated Jan. 17, 2020).
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fundamental element concerning future space issues. 6 4 Entering into
force in 1972, the Liability Convention expands the principle that the
launching country is absolutely responsible for damages resulting from
the state's actions in space.6 5 Like the other subsequent treaties, the
Liability Convention expands the reach and understanding of its
covered principle.66 The Liability Convention not only reiterates the
strict liability principle but also establishes a mechanism by which the
liability might be adjudicated and enforced.6 7 When a launch causes an
incident that necessitates compensation, initial overtures are brought
through diplomatic means. 68 Should diplomacy prove futile, the
aggrieved states may bring an action through COPUOS or the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and, in doing so, establish a
temporary claims commission, the procedure of which is further laid out
in the treaty.6 9

b. Subsequent COPUOS Resolutions
Though the efforts of the Outer Space Treaty and its progeny
were a valiant attempt at shaping international space law, the
agreements left many gaps. New technologies and discoveries put
pressure on the sweeping principles of the Outer Space Treaty. 70
International space stations,71 nonnuclear weapons systems, 7 2 and the
ability to harvest space resourceS 73 are but a few examples of progress
that fail to fit squarely within the parameters established in treaties;
thus, their governance under the international regimes is largely one of
state practice and, by extension, international custom. 74

64.
65.
66.
note 61.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See Liability Convention, supra note 61.
See id.
See id.; see, e.g., Registration Convention, supra note 61; Rescue Agreement, supra
See Liability Convention, supra note 61.
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., Fernholz, supra note 57.

ANNUAL
71.
See NAT'L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., NASA/TP-2017-219791,
HIGHLIGHTS OF RESULTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION OCTOBER 1, 2015-OCTOBER

1, 2016 (2017), https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/iss-annualresults-highlights_2017_singlepage_ 1-9-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV5A-MKN6].
72.
See David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the
Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1187, 1210-15 (2009).
73.
See Lauren E. Shaw, Asteroids, the New Western Frontier:Applying Principles of the
GeneralMining Law of 1872 to IncentivizeAsteroidMining,78 J. AIR L. & COM. 121, 137-38 (2013).
Compare Koplow, supra note 72, at 1210-15, and Shaw, supra note 73, at
74.
137-38, and InternationalSpace Station Legal Framework, ESA, https://m.esa.int/OurActivi-
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Domestic legislation,7 5 international legal bodies, 7 6 and
additional regulations established by COPUOS influence the state
practice-based legal regime.77 While no significant multilateral treaties
follow the Moon Agreement, COPUOS continued to shape space
practice through four additional declarations of space principles. 78 This
system established a space regime for broadcasting, remote sensing,
nuclear energy, and benefits sharing that has a profound impact on
state practice. 79 Though not officially binding, the declarations of
COPUOS have significant weight in the legal space regime and have
arguably developed into customary elements of international space
law.80
B. Relevant Domestic Practice ConcerningSpace
Beyond the realm of international space law are domestic
regulations designed to implement international agreements and shape
the states' practices in space.8 1 States with interests in space
established space agencies to regulate space activities within the

ties/Human andRoboticExploration/International SpaceStation/International SpaceStation_1egal-framework [https://perma.cc/C7C7-FAJC] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020), with Liability
Convention, supra note 61.
75.
See, e.g., U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90,
129 Stat. 704 (2015) (providing domestic legislation over unregulated asteroid and celestial body
mining).
76.
See, e.g., Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules for Arbitration
of Disputes Relating to Outer Space Activities (2011), https://pea-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/20 16/0 1/Permanent-Court-of-Arbitration-Optional-Rules-for-Arbitration-of-Dis[https://perma.cc/Q8JX-3SB6]
[hereinafter PCA
putes-Relating-to-Outer-Space-Activities.pdf
Optional Rules] (establishing a specific set of rules for the governance of space-related
arbitrations).
77.
See G.A. Res. 51/122, Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account
the Needs of Developing Countries (Dec. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Benefits Declaration]; G.A. Res.
47/68, Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (Dec. 14, 1992)
[hereinafter Nuclear Power Principles]; G.A. Res. 41/65, Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of
the Earth from Outer Space (Dec. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Remote Sensing Principles]; G.A. Res.
37/92, Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct
Television Broadcasting (Dec. 10, 1982) [hereinafter Broadcasting Principles].
See Benefits Declaration, supra note 77; Nuclear Power Principles, supra note 77;
78.
Remote Sensing Principles, supra note 77; Broadcasting Principles, supra note 77.
79.
See Benefits Declaration, supra note 77; Nuclear Power Principles, supra note 77;
Remote Sensing Principles, supra note 77; Broadcasting Principles, supra note 77.
80.
See Sriram Swaminathan, The Applicability of Space Law Principles to Basic Space
Science: An Update, 15 SEMINARS U.N. PROGRAMME ON SPACE APPLICATIONS 117, 121 (2005).
81.
See, e.g., U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90,
129 Stat. 704 (2015).
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confines of the international regime. 82 However, recently, some
domestic legislations in response to the modern commercialization of
space might be in violation of the international regime. 8 3 The United
States took a dramatic step forward with respect to exploiting space
resources by enacting the US Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act of 2015, which entitles US citizens to resources
obtained in space, effectively legalizing space mining.8 4 Soon after,
Luxembourg enacted a similar piece of legislation, becoming the first
EU nation to legalize commercial space mining on the domestic level.85
While such space-mining legislation does not appear to violate the
Outer Space Treaty on its face, the establishment of individual
ownership rights remains questionable.8 6 However, some of the
language in the Outer Space Treaty suggests that the drafters and
signees likely foresaw the eventual capability to extract and use space
resources.87

II. MODERN FORUM FOR SPACE-RELATED DISPUTES
This Part considers how the international space law regime
handles outer space disputes. To establish the need for a consolidated
dispute resolution and governance mechanism, the existing forum for
space disputes is analyzed within the framework of the three
fundamental principles of space law.
A. The Domestic Court Solution
Given the prevalence of state action in outer space up to this
point, a potential means of resolving space-related disputes would be
allowing an aggrieved party to bring the dispute in the domestic court
system.

82.
See, e.g., National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat.
426, 427 (current version at 51 U.S.C. §§ 20101-20164 (2018)); Other Space Agencies, ESA,
http://m.esa.int/OurActivities/Human-andRoboticExploration/Other-space-agencies
[https://perma.cc/L9G3-FKJX] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
83.
See Hamer, supra note 18.
84.
U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat.
704.
85.
See Mariella Moon, Luxembourg's Asteroid Mining Law Takes Effect August 1st,
ENGADGET (July 30, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/07/30/luxembourg-asteroid-mininglaw-august-1/ [https://perma.cc/PP5S-66XQ].
86.
See Peter B. de Selding, New U.S. SpaceMining Law's Treaty ComplianceMayDepend
on Implementation, SPACENEWS (Dec. 9, 2015), https://spacenews.com/u-s-commercial-space-actstreaty-compliance-may-depend-on-implementation/ [https://perma.cc/37VS-NH3K].
87.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
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1. Potential Strengths of the Domestic Court Solution
Domestic courts have jurisdiction over a wide range of claims. It
is the general understanding of international law that "each
nation-state, being a sovereign entity under international law, has
exclusive jurisdiction within its territorial boundaries over all persons,
whether nationals or foreigners, and all things, whether tangible or
intangible."8 8 In addition to this broad territorial principle of
jurisdiction, international law recognizes a series of principles that
expand the jurisdiction of domestic courts, including (1) the nationality
principle of jurisdiction over a nation's citizens located outside national
territory, (2) the passive personality principle of jurisdiction over
disputes with a citizen victim, (3) the protective principle of jurisdiction
over extraterritorial conduct that threatens the interest of the state,
and (4) the principle of universal jurisdiction over crimes against all
states.89

A space-related dispute will likely come within the jurisdiction
of a state's court via any of the aforementioned principles aside from
universal jurisdiction. This broad jurisdiction over space disputes will
permit plaintiffs to seek relief in their domestic courts, as well as the
domestic courts of the party that caused the injury. Furthermore, the
domestic court solution provides private parties with access to dispute
resolution without requiring a state to espouse the claim, unlike
international courts.9 0 In granting access to private parties, domestic
courts provide dispute resolution to the widest group of potential
complainants among all of the potential forums.
2. Potential Weaknesses of the Domestic Court Solution
Despite the advantage of a wide jurisdictional net combined with
private party access, the domestic court solution has shortcomings
concerning politics, familiarity with the law, and potential party
defenses. Although the Outer Space Treaty and its progeny were
ratified in pursuit of a peaceful and jointly explored space, historically
outer space is another realm in which states compete for influence.9 1
88.
See Sloup, supra note 13, at 636 (citing 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 325 (H.
Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)).
See id. at 644-50.
89.
90.
See David Hamilton, State Responsibility to Espouse Claims of Nationals Based on
Contracts with ForeignNations, 2 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 38, 39 (1977).
91.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9 (recognizing "the common interest of all
mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes
[and] . . . [d]esiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the
legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes"); Leroy Chiao & Elliot
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This competition may bias a domestic court to put its state's national
interest in space before the interests of injured parties. In disputes
of this nature, the increased political pressure of successful
space exploration could negatively affect the neutral resolution of
space-related disputes.
Domestic courts in the United States, compared to the
alternative proposed forums for space-related issues, also present a
significant shortcoming: a reluctance to engage with international
law. 92 Furthermore, they lack expertise in international law or space
law. State courts within the United States are courts of general
jurisdiction and hear a wide variety of issues that come before them. 93
Congress has created specialized courts in the federal judiciary, but
none address space-related disputes. 9 4 This lack of specialization,

particularly in US state courts that focus primarily on the
interpretation of state law, may significantly delay or potentially
incorrectly decide a dispute that lies primarily within a field of
international law.
Of greater concern, however, is the possibility that a private
party with a space-related dispute may not be able to adjudicate or
settle their dispute at all. Though this analysis acknowledges that
private participation in space is the impetus for a reformation of the
international space law regime, outer space still remains a realm
dominated by state action.95 It is likely then that a private party
bringing a space-related dispute may find itself in opposition to a
foreign state and that the state will likely rely on the sovereign
immunity doctrine. The doctrine of sovereign immunity exists in two
forms: absolute immunity, which prevents a state from being brought
into a suit in a foreign domestic court without the state's consent, and
Pulham, The Politics of Space Exploration, SPACE FOUND., https://www.spacefoundation.org/2016/05/01/the-politics-of-space-exploration/ [https://perma.cc/JHD7-Z72Q] (last visited
Jan. 21, 2020); Bryan Preston, Why NASA Needs to Beat China in the New Space Race,
FEDERALIST: SPACE (Dec. 13, 2018), https://thefederalist.com/20 18/12/13/nasa-needs-beat-chinanew-space-race/ [https://perma.cc/R7DY-WBQT].
92.
See John F. Coyle, The Case for Writing InternationalLaw into the U.S. Code, 56 B.C.
L. REv. 433, 434 (2015) ("Over the past few decades, however, the judiciary has taken steps to limit
the direct role played by international law in the U.S. legal system.").
93.
See Tracey E. George & Margaret S. Williams, Designing Judicial Institutions: Special
Federal Courts and the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 6 (2013) (unpublished
manuscript), https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/events/George.pdf [https://perma.cc/LFZ8-MX5M].
94.
See id. at 10.
95.
While private space flight has been legalized since 2004, the field is heavily regulated
by the US government. Additionally, the international space law regime continues to place liability
squarely on the participating states, placing damages from private space flight within the realm
of state responsibility. See Liability Convention, supra note 61; U.S. Commercial Space Launch
Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015).
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the US-recognized restrictive immunity, in which a sovereign is
immune only with regard to sovereign actions and not commercial
actions.9 6 Whether a state's actions in outer space are sovereign as
opposed to commercial is yet to be decided. For now, the present space
law regime suggests space-related actions are sovereign and thus
immune, although this will likely change as the commercialization of
space continues.9

Assuming a complainant manages to obtain a domestic court
resolution to their space-related dispute, a problem remains with the
enforcement of such decision on a foreign plaintiff. Recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments are first governed by the existence of
treaties and agreements, then in accordance with the domestic law of
potentially enforcing states.9 8 As the United States is not a party to an
international convention on this matter, parties seeking enforcement
must determine if the United States and the enforcing state have
a treaty or agreement on enforcement.9 9 International custom calls
for the recognition and enforcement of decisions subject to four
criteria: (1) the deciding court has jurisdiction, (2) the defendant was
properly notified of the action, (3) the proceedings were not fraudulent,
and (4) the judgment is not against the public policy of the potentially
enforcing state. 100 Additionally, the party seeking enforcement will
likely need to hire an attorney practicing in the proposed enforcement
state to ensure the compliance of the decision with the domestic laws of
the enforcing nation. 101 Despite a successfully settled dispute within
the domestic legal system, a plaintiff would struggle to obtain any

96.
See Daniel T. Murphy, The American Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity: An Historical
Analysis, 13 VILL. L. REV. 583 (1968); John M. Niehuss, InternationalLaw: Sovereign Immunity:
The FirstDecade of the Tate Letter Policy, 60 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1142-43 (1962).
97.
The current Outer Space Treaty is written with states in mind and emphasizes the
role of states in outer space exploration. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9. This focus on the
role of the state infers a belief that space exploration was a state practice; however, the increase
in private exploration and the potential commercialization of space resources would likely fall
under the commercial acts exception in a restrictive sovereign immunity regime.
98.
See Enforcement of Judgments, U.S. DEP'T ST.-BUREAU CONSULAR AFF.,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/internl-judicialasst/Enforcement-of-Judges.html [https://perma.cc/6RXR-MMCL] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
99.
See STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY & THOMAS 0. MAIN, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THEORY AND APPLICATION 613-15 (2010); Enforcement of Judgments,

supra note 98.
100.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

(AM. LAW INST. 1987).
101.
See Enforcement of Judgments, supra note 98.
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recompense if the relationship between the domestic and foreign state
is unfriendly. 102
By enabling private parties to bring suit, the domestic court
solution is most strongly aligned with the principle of outer space as a
common heritage of all humankind and sends a clear message that the
interests of private parties in space will be protected under the domestic
legal system. 103 However, this causes the domestic court solution to
stray from other guiding principles of the Outer Space Treaty. Rather
than collaborating to establish a single legal regime for space disputes,
the domestic court theory promotes the creation of multiple regimes.
This individualism is in stark contrast with the goals of collaboration
and joint contribution to space exploration. 104 Similarly, a domestic
court approach would emphasize national sovereignty over space
disputes in opposition to the stated goal of a sovereignless space.105
Within the domestic system, national law, sovereign immunity, and
foreign enforcement mechanisms, each reinforces the separate
sovereign powers of the participating states. While states and their
legal systems are not likely to merge into a single body of law, granting
jurisdiction on the grounds of sovereignty and territoriality reinforces
the notion of state control over outer space, in contradiction to the goal
of a sovereignless realm.106
B. The InternationalCourt of Justice Solution
Analysis of the international space law regime is often compared
to the regimes governing other bodies of sovereignless international
commons like the Antarctic and the high seas. 107 Disputes concerning
such international commons are sometimes resolved, if not
diplomatically, through the legal mechanisms of the International

102.
See id. ("Although there are many reasons for the absence of such agreements, a
principal stumbling block appears to be the perception of many foreign states that U.S. money
judgments are excessive according to their notions of liability.").
103.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
104.
See id.
105.
See id.
106.
See id.
107.
See Bo Min Kim, Governance of the Global Commons: The Deep Seabed,
the
Antarctic,
Outer
Space,
WORLD
ECON.
UPDATE
(Aug.
22,
2014),
http://www.kiep.go.kr/eng/sub/view.do?bbsld=worldEcoUdt&nttld= 113[https://perma.cc/T5MRVEY6]. But see Henry R. Hertzfeld et al., How Simple Terms Mislead Us: The Pitfalls of Thinking
About Outer Space as a Commons, 58 PROC. INT'L INST. SPACE L. COLLOQUIUM ON L. OUTER SPACE
533 (2015).
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Court of Justice. 108 Since outer space is a sovereignless international
commons, as stated in the Outer Space Treaty, an international dispute
resolution body like the ICJ would provide an appealing forum for such
disputes. 109
1. Potential Strengths of the ICJ Solution
Established by the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, the
ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, with the
twofold purpose of settling legal disputes in accordance with
international law and providing advisory opinions to the United
Nations. 110 Applying the sources of international law as set forth in
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (the "ICJ
Statute"), the ICJ is responsible for settling disputes brought before it
by states party to the United Nations and non-UN states party to the
ICJ Statute.1 1 1 The court is elected by the General Assembly and
composed of fifteen judges from separate nations, none of which may
exercise any political or administrative function as decided by the
court. 1 12 Additionally, states may, in an individual capacity, declare
themselves subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in relation
to other states accepting this same obligation. 113 As of January 2018,
this accounted for 73 of the 193 members of the United Nations.11 4
At first glance, the international nature of the ICJ makes for a
reasonable forum for international disputes related to space. As an
international body of justice dedicated to the interpretation and
execution of international law, the ICJ may be the best suited to
manage the intricacies of the treaty-based outer space regime. 115 With
an increasing number of states establishing space programs and

Issues concerning the global commons are typically resolved through the
108.
interpretation of treaties. See, e.g., Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: N.Z. intervening),
Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 226 (Mar. 31) (interpreting the whaling convention in resolving an
interstate issue). The jurisdiction of the ICJ is dependent upon state-brought issues. See ICJ
Statute, supra note 14, art. 34(1).
109.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
110.
ICJ Statute, supra note 14, arts. 1, 36; Liz Heffernan, The Nuclear Weapons Opinions:
Reflections on the Advisory Procedure of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 28 STETSON L. REV.
133, 136-37 (1998).
111.
See ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38.
112.
See id. arts. 3(1), 4(1), 16(1).
113.
See id. art. 36(1)-(2).
114.
See DeclarationsRecognizing the Jurisdictionof the Court as Compulsory, INT'L CT.
JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations [https://perma.cc/7YSL-2QBJ] (last visited Jan. 21,

2020).
See ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38; see also supra Section L.A (discussing the
115.
treaty-based space law regime).
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executing missions, a forum with experience handling interstate
disputes would be beneficial in a field where states currently dominate
participation. 116 Due to the independent and neutral third-party nature
of the judges, the ICJ would also remove the public policy protection of
space programs that may emerge in the domestic court solution.1 17
Having developed the Outer Space Treaty and the subsequent
space agreements within the mechanisms of the United Nations, 118
centralizing space-related disputes to a United Nations judicial body
would concentrate additional practice in this area, consolidating future
jurisprudence and encouraging collaboration in future regulation.
Additionally, under Article 26 of the ICJ Statute, the lCJ may establish
a chamber dedicated to resolving a particular category of cases, further
specializing the ICJ as the appropriate forum for space-related
disputes.1 19
2. Potential Weaknesses of the ICJ Solution
While familiarity with the law and experience in state conflict
lends support to the lCJ as a space dispute-settling mechanism, 12 0 the
lCJ's restrictive jurisdiction hardly encourages the private exploration
and use of space. 12 1 The ICJ is an international body dedicated to the
resolution of disputes between two or more states. 122 As such, private
space programs possess no standing within the ICJ's jurisdiction. 12 3
Though a state may espouse the dispute of its citizens, this provides
little incentive for private space exploration, as espousal is entirely
dependent upon state action with no domestic means to force the
government into action. 124 Even upon espousal of a claim, there are
many issues that may prevent actual redress of a space-related dispute.
For example, a state may choose not to take the issue before the ICJ,

116.
See ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38; Charles Q. Choi, Number of Worldwide Space
Agencies on the Rise, SPACE.COM (Feb. 25, 2010), https://www.space.com/7969-number-worldwidespace-agencies-rise.html [https://perma.cc/CHV2-2KMX]; see, e.g., Houser, supra note 17; Rivers,
Regan & Jiang, supra note 16.
117.
See ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 3; see discussion supra Section H.A.
See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
118.
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF.,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html
[https://perma.cc/KN3D-YLJP] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
119.
See ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 26(1)-(2).
120.
See id. art. 38.
121.
See id. art. 34.
122.
See id. arts. 1, 34.
123.
See id. art. 34.
124.
See Hamilton, supra note 90, at 39-40.
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preferring to settle the dispute privately through diplomatic channels
and preventing the development of any space-based jurisprudence. 125
Additionally, such claims may be combined with other disputes against
a foreign state, meaning any recovery paid to the state must be shared
among the private parties of the dispute. 126
Moreover, states are often reluctant to subject themselves to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the court. 127 The ICJ is generally a court of
voluntary jurisdiction, unable to decide an international dispute
without the consent of the disputing parties. 128 The United States, as
well as over half the members of the United Nations, is not subject to
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, leaving the ICJ no grounds to
decide a dispute without the consent of the parties or jurisdiction
granted via another international agreement. 129 As of 2008, none of the
eighty-plus international agreements subjecting the United States to
ICJ jurisdiction involved space-related disputes. 130 Even assuming
espousal by the state of the private party, an individual may find their
dispute unadjudicated simply on the grounds that the opposing state
refuses to consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
In addition, although the ICJ appears to be an ideal centralized
organ for space-related disputes as an international body well versed in
the interpretation of international agreements and the resolution of
disputes, 13 1 the ability of states to reject the court's jurisdiction
contradicts the fundamental principles of sovereignless space and
international collaboration. 1 32 As an international judicial body, the ICJ
appears to align well with the principles of sovereignless space and
international collaboration as power to adjudicate is removed from the
state and given to an independent body. This alignment, however, is
nullified by the ability of states to reject ICJ jurisdiction. 1 33 Indeed, the
political nature of accepting or rejecting ICJ jurisdiction places power
directly in the hands of states. The need for espousal of claims also

125.
See id.
126.
See id. at 40.
127.
See Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdictionand Compliance in Recent Decisions of the
InternationalCourt of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815, 817 (2007).
128.
ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 36.
129.
See id.; DeclarationsRecognizing the Jurisdictionof the Court as Compulsory, supra
note 114.
130.

See STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB 10206, THE UNITED STATES

AND THE "WORLD COURT" 2 (2018); Sean D. Murphy, The United States and the InternationalCourt
of Justice: Coping with Antinomies, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES: THE UNITED STATES AND
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 99-111 (Cesare P. R. Romano ed., 2009).

131.
132.
133.

See ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38.
See discussion supra Section I.A.
See ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 36(2).
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significantly dampens the rights of individuals in space, limiting space
to the will of the state rather than all humankind.
C. The Claims Commission Solution
During the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty, nations
recognized that space exploration carried an inherent risk of serious
disputes concerning a state's space program and its impact on
individuals. 134 This risk led to the inclusion of Article VII, establishing
absolute liability for space injuries, and eventually to the drafting of the
Liability Convention. 135 The Liability Convention establishes the
procedure by which states may bring claims concerning damages
created by a state's exploration of space. 136 The treaty's last resort for
such space-related disputes is a temporary three-judge claims
commission composed of a member selected by each state party and a
mutually appointed chairman. 137 It is the duty of this commission to
"decide the merits of the claim for compensation and determine the
amount of compensation payable, if any." 138
1. Potential Strengths of the Claims Commission Solution
The claims commission solution is the only body explicitly
established by a multilateral space treaty. 139 Additionally, the
three-party commission is an independent decision-making body not
subject to political pressures of domestic court systems. 140 Assuming
that each state party to the claims commission is interested in a fair
and well-reasoned decision, the state parties appoint commissioners
with sufficient expertise in international law or space-related disputes.
Thus, the use of a Liability Convention claims commission would result
in an independent, expert decision.

134.
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. VII.
135.
See Liability Convention, supra note 61; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. VII;
Lara L. Manzione, Multinational Investment in the Space Station: An Outer Space Model for
InternationalCooperation?, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 507, 520 (2002).
136.
See Liability Convention, supra note 61.
137.
See id. arts. XIV, XV.
138.
See id. art. XVIII.
139.
See discussion supra Sections IIA, B; infra Section II.D.
140.
See discussion supra Section II.A (comparing the potential domestic political pressures
of a domestic court with the absence of domestic pressures in an international court).

2020]

A CENTRAL FOR UMFOR SPACE-RELATED DISPUTES

649

2. Potential Weaknesses of the Claims Commission Solution
However, the claims commission solution is not without flaws,
as its procedure and effectiveness are heavily influenced by the state
participants. For example, the commission decision is not binding on
the state participants unless agreed upon prior to the decision. 14 1
Should a potentially liable state party not wish to subject itself to the
decision of the commission without first hearing the ruling, it may
simply refuse to be bound by the decision. 142 In such situations, the
decision of the claims commission loses power and effectively becomes
a public advisory opinion, subject to the good-faith consideration
of the states. 143 Though the decision is made available to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, the resulting decision is not
binding unless adopted by the state, either willingly or subject to
pressure from the international community.1 44
In addition to the potential advisory status of the decision, the
claims commission also suffers a shortcoming evident in many of the
modern forums for space claims-a jurisdictional bar against
individuals.1 4 5 Because the claims commission is a state-established
body, individuals subject to damages from a state or private space
program cannot bring a dispute before a commission without the
espousal of their claim. 14 6 Similar to an individual in ICJ jurisdiction,
the injured party is once again subject to the decision-making of the
state and the international political climate.14 7 As of 2009, the
unenforceable and nonbinding procedure, combined with the Liability
Convention's emphasis on diplomatic solutions,14 8 has failed to produce
a single Article 4 claims commission.14 9 Despite this historic lack of use,
141.
See Liability Convention, supra note 61, art. XIX.
142.
See id.
143.
See id.
144.
See id.
145.
See discussion supra Sections IIA, B; infra Section II.D.
146.
See Liability Convention, supra note 61, art. VIII.
147.
See discussion supra Section II.B.
148.
See Liability Convention, supra note 61, art. XIX.
149.
See Fabio Tronchetti, The PCA Rules for Dispute Settlement in Outer Space: A
Significant Step Forward, 29 SPACE POL'Y 181, 183 (2013). In 2009, the Cosmos 2251-Iridium 33
collision presented an almost perfect case study for the invocation of the Liability Convention when
a decommissioned Soviet satellite and a private US corporation-owned satellite collided over
Siberia. Tronchetti, supra, at 183; Frans G. von der Dunk, Too-Close Encountersof the Third-Party
Kind: Will the Liability Convention Stand the Test of the Cosmos 2251-Iridium 33 Collision?, 2009
PROC. INT'L INST. SPACE L. 199, 199. While a claims commission was never invoked, the near
implementation of the collision stirred strong debate in the legal and scientific communities as to
the adequacy of the Liability Convention, particularly in relation to private-party satellites in a
state-dominated space regime. See Tronchetti, supra, at 184-86; see, e.g., Timothy G. Nelson,
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the claims commission solution could gain relevance with the reignition
of space exploration in recent years.1 50
In relation to the three principles of space, the claims
commission is presumptively compatible given its establishment within
the scheme of international space treaties. 15 1 Inherently, the claims
commissions represent the principle of international collaboration, as
the Liability Convention required the ratification of its party states. 152
Furthermore, the independent nature of the chairman removes
adjudicating power from the states in alignment with the objective of a
sovereignless space. 153 However, the nonbinding nature of the decisions,
as well as the emphasis on diplomatic solutions prior to a commission,
prioritizes sovereignty such that it prevents the effective use of these
commissions; though an emphasis on diplomacy may encourage
collaboration for the resolution of space disputes.15 4 Likewise, the
reliance on the espousal method to bring private claims further
reinforces sovereign primacy in space and dampens the efforts
of private parties in space, limiting the potential for benefitting
humankind.155 Though the claims commission may be the
internationally recognized body for governing space disputes in
conjunction with the fundamental space principles, its lack of
effectiveness, enforcement, and use are indicative of a need for change.
D. Permanent Court of ArbitrationSolution
Delegates to the Hague Conference of 1899, aware that
diplomacy is not always possible, established a Permanent Court of
Arbitration (PCA) to serve as an ever-present forum for settling
international differences. 15 6 In December of 2011, the PCA took a
significant step in resolving space-related disputes when it adopted the
Optional Rules for Arbitration of Dispute Relating to Outer Space

Regulating the Void: In-Orbit Collisions and Space Debris, 40 J. SPACE L. 105, 120 (2016); von der
Dunk, supra, at 201-06.
150.
See, e.g., Choi, supra note 116; Houser, supra note 17; Rivers, Regan & Jiang, supra
note 16.
151.
See discussion supra Section I.A.3.
See Liability Convention, supra note 61, art. XXIV.
152.
See id. art. XV; discussion supra Section I.A. 1.
153.
154.
See Liability Convention, supra note 61, arts. IX, XIX.
155.
See Hamilton, supra note 90, at 39-40.
156.
See Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague
Convention I) art. 20, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199; History, PERMANENT CT. ARB., https://peacpa.org/en/about/introduction/history/ [https://perma.cc/FP6U-NXFL] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
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Activities (the "Optional Rules").15 7 Following an investigation noting
the increase in space activity and diversity of space parties, the PCA
advisory group drafted a series of optional arbitration rules that apply
to consenting parties. 15 8 These Optional Rules do not create a new
forum for resolving space-related disputes but instead modify the
procedure of the preexisting PCA. 15 9 For the purpose of this analysis,
the explanation of PCA procedure assumes that the participating
parties consent to the application of the Optional Rules, though it is
important to note that these rules will not be applied if the parties
withhold consent. 160 The Optional Rules consist of forty-three articles,
though a comprehensive analysis of each is beyond the scope of this
Note. 161 Instead, this analysis focuses on the articles of the Optional
Rules pertaining to or aligning with the fundamental principles of the
Outer Space Treaty.
1. Potential Strengths of the Permanent Court of Arbitration Solution
The Optional Rules of the PCA present an example of the
current body of international dispute resolution adapting to the
exponential change in space exploration. 162 Among these adaptations is
the recognition that space exploration has proceeded beyond the public
sphere and into the domain of private commercial expansion. 163
Recognizing this increase, the PCA modified rules to reflect the
involvement of private entities in outer space disputes. 164 As such,
private parties may, subject to the consent of all involved parties,
pursue arbitration under the Optional Rules at the PCA. 165
Furthermore, in recognition that states still play a predominant role in
space exploration, and, therefore, the potential for their involvement in
a space-related dispute remains high, the Optional Rules, once
consented to, bar a claim of sovereign immunity. 166 In addition to
resolving these space-related disputes, the Optional Rules also provide
consenting state parties the option to bring an issue on the
157.
See Merryl Azriel, PermanentCourt ofArbitration Adopts Space DisputeRules, SPACE
SAFETY MAG. (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-debris/falling-satellite/permanent-court-arbitration-adopts-space-dispute-rules/ [https://perma.cc/ZXR8-MHCY].
158.
See Tronchetti, supra note 149, at 184.
159.
See PCA OPTIONAL RULES, supra note 76, at intro.; Tronchetti, supra note 149, at 185.
160.
See PCA OPTIONAL RULES, supra note 76, at intro.
161.
See id.
162.
See Tronchetti, supra note 149, at 184.
163.
See id.
164.
See PCA OPTIONAL RULES, supra note 76, at intro.; Tronchetti, supra note 149, at 185.
165.
See PCA OPTIONAL RULES, supra note 76, art. 1(1); Tronchetti, supra note 149, at 185.
166.
See PCA OPTIONAL RULES, supra note 76, art. 1(2); Tronchetti, supra note 149, at 185.
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interpretation or application of existing space-related treaties. 167 While
this is a relatively small aspect of the Optional Rules, the power to
interpret treaty obligations is an important development in
international space law and could play a significant role if used to
interpret potentially controversial treaty provisions.16 8
Procedurally, the Optional Rules provide the parties with the
choice of a one-, three-, or five-arbitrator panel. 169 In a one-arbitrator
panel, the parties must agree to a single arbitrator. 170 Whether in a
panel of three or five, the parties each select an arbitrator, and these
arbitrators then work together to select the remaining arbitrator.1 7 1
Should the parties or arbitrators be unable to agree upon the selection
of the necessary number of arbitrators, then the appointing authority,
in this case the Secretary-General of the PCA, would select the
necessary arbitrators. 172 For this purpose, the PCA maintains a
standing list of arbitrators and scientific experts in space-related fields
for appointment under the Optional Rules. 173 This compiled list of
experts and arbitrators enables the PCA to ensure the arbitration panel
presents a level playing field composed of arbitrators well suited to the
complexities of international law and space-related matters.
The most notable aspect of the PCA Optional Rules is the
binding nature of the resolution of the dispute.17 4 Although bringing a

space-related dispute before the PCA is a completely voluntary
undertaking, once enacted, the findings and awards of the arbitrators
are binding upon the participating parties. 175 Upon reaching a decision,
the arbitrators release a public declaration of the award, with reasoning
included at the consent of the parties, to be carried out without delay. 176
This public and binding award system differentiates the PCA Optional
Rules from the alternative regimes whose rulings are effectively
advisory opinions, placing little burden on the liable party.177

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See Tronchetti, supra note 149, at 186.
See PCA OPTIONAL RULES, supra note 76, at intro.; Tronchetti, supra note 149, at 186.
See PCA OPTIONAL RULES, supra note 76, art. 9(1).
See id. art. 8(1).
See id. art. 9(1).
See id. arts. 6(1), 8(1), 9(3).
See id. at intro.
Tronchetti, supra note 149, at 186.
See PCA OPTIONAL RULES, supra note 76, arts. 1, 34.
See id. art. 34.
See id.; discussion supra Section II.B.1.
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2. Potential Weaknesses of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
Solution
Although the PCA Optional Rules made significant strides in the
development of a consolidated forum for the resolution of space-related
disputes, there is opportunity for refinement in relation to the
fundamental space principles. Sovereign domination of space is
significantly weakened by the inclusion of private parties in the
Optional Rules, and private access to adjudication protects the interests
of humankind in space.178 However, the jurisdiction of the PCA, while
expanded to allow for private parties, is still granted by party consent,
preserving the power of sovereignty in space-related disputes. 17 9
Furthermore, the Optional Rules also permit the parties to agree on
which law is to be applied to their dispute.18 0 Finally, the Optional Rules
allowing parties to prevent publication of the PCA's reasoning
effectively limit the creation of space dispute precedent and run
contrary to the principle of international collaboration. 18 1 In essence,
the PCA Optional Rules are the closest to a system created in alignment
with the three fundamental principles of space law, yet an alternative
solution may better manage the future of space-related disputes.
III. THE GLOBAL SPACE ORGANIZATION: A PROPOSED
HYBRID SOLUTION
A. Elements for a Global Space Organization
Given the recent reinvigoration of space exploration both in the
public and private sector, it is easy to envision an increase in potential
disputes arising from such activity. 1 82 While Dr. Davies's claim to Mars
may border on the absurd, concrete space disputes-like the recently
drilled hole discovered in the International Space Station and the
unapproved launching of microsatellites in the United States-will only
grow more frequent as space exploration continues. 183 Spacefaring

178.
See PCA OPTIONAL RULES, supra note 76, at intro.
See id. art. 1(1).
179.
180.
See id. art. 35.
See id. art. 34.
181.
182.
See, e.g., Choi, supra note 116; Andrew Griffin, Someone Drilled Through the
International Space Station from the Inside, Astronaut Says, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 28, 2018),
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/iss-hole-nasa-russia-international-space-station-astronaut-drill-inside-a8702131.htmI [https://perma.cc/6A97-FJ2X]; Hersher
& Domonoske, supra note 1; Houser, supra note 17; Rivers, Regan & Jiang, supra note 16.
183.
See Steve Gorman, NASA Addresses Unexplained Space Station Hole but Mystery
Remains Unsolved, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2018, 10:41 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-
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parties should not be subject to the potentially flawed mechanisms
currently in existence simply because an alternative forum in
compliance with the fundamental principles of space law does not
exist.1 84 These flawed mechanisms are particularly poignant when one
considers that all the fundamental elements necessary to ensure
compliance
with these principles exist scattered throughout
the currently established bodies. A hybrid organization, dedicated to
the resolution of space-related disputes and the establishment of
international practice concerning outer space, should therefore be
established to rectify the shortcomings of the modern space law regime
and establish a consistent body of practice to further space exploration
and use.
1. Elements Necessary for a Sovereignless Space
The Outer Space Treaty and the subsequent agreements on
space law place a fundamental emphasis on the limitation of
sovereignty in the exploration and use of outer space.1 85 The current
mechanisms for resolving space-related disputes largely retain
elements of state sovereignty, reinforcing the need for a new body to
limit the primacy of the state. 186 However, procedural implementations
made within the current regimes that do align with the fundamental
space principles must be implemented within the newly created "Global
Space Organization." First and foremost, the regulation and
adjudication of international space disputes should be removed from
the domestic courts and centralized in a neutral, international
decision-making body. Space law is primarily a body based on
international law and practice, and leaving the resolutions of
international space disputes in domestic courts strengthens the
position of states in the exploration of space. 18 7 Likewise, the body
dedicated to resolving such disputes must be an independent and
neutral group of experts not accountable to the political pressures of

station-hole/nasa-addresses-unexplained-space-station-hole-but-mystery-remains-unsolvedidUSKCN1MEO8M [https://perma.cc/WC23-FCH8]; Griffin, supra note 182; Caleb Henry, FCC
Fines Swarm $900,000 for Unauthorized Smallsat Launch, SPACENEWS (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://spacenews.com/fec-fines-swarm-900000-for-unauthorized-smallsat-launch/
[https://perma.cc/V2EK-X6F7]; Parkin, supra note 5.
184.
See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
185.
See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
186.
See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
187.
See Registration Convention, supra note 61; Liability Convention, supra note 61;
Rescue Agreement, supra note 61; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9. But see, e.g., U.S. Commercial
Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015).
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domestic politics. 18 8 Finally, and perhaps most integral to the reduction

of sovereign influence in space, use of this forum must be dependent on
a waiver of sovereign immunity. By stripping away many of the residual
powers that accompany state sovereignty, the new body would reinforce
space exploration and use as an international endeavor.
2. Elements Necessary for International Collaboration
Exploration and use of a sovereignless space are dependent upon
the collaboration and interconnectivity of the parties engaging in such
endeavors, a principle imbedded in the goals of the Outer Space Treaty.
The principle of international cooperation has been both an incredible
development and frustration to the resolution of space disputes-as
shown by the wide variety of existing mechanisms.18 9 A consolidated
mechanism must adopt three elements of existing forum to fully
embody the principle of international collaboration: (1) become a
permanent body with publicly shared precedent and reasoning,
(2) create binding decisions with an appropriate enforcement
mechanism, and (3) provide a forum for not only resolving disputes but
also sharing information and discovery during space exploration. 19 0
The permanency of the new hybrid body is essential to the
consolidation of international practice concerning the exploration and
uses of space. With states giving way to private parties in space
exploration, clearly delineated rules for space exploration are
necessary. These rules can be established through a body dedicated to
settling disputes rooted in space actions. A permanent body with
binding precedent and a proper appeals system will provide the
necessary clarifications in treaty understanding that has slowed the
progress of humankind in space. However, for this body to be effective,
its decisions must be both binding and enforceable on the parties.
To encourage the use of space, any system established to settle
space-related disputes must give parties confidence that any resolution
comes with the full force of law. Finally, progress in space must
continue to be a joint venture-one that is fueled by the discoveries
of all participants. While states have engaged in a variety of
information-sharing bodies, the consolidation of such practices into a

188.
See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
189.
See discussion supra Sections I.A.2, II, I.A. 1.
190.
Such an information-sharing mechanism already exists, as collaboration via
information sharing is an integral part of the Outer Space Treaty. See Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 9, art. XI; discussion supra Section I.A.2.

656

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 22:3:627

central organization will facilitate future development and continue to
shape the practice of space exploration and use. 19 1
3. Elements Necessary for the Benefit of All Humankind
Many of the elements discussed in this proposal overlap in
protecting specific fundamental principles of space law. However, the
following two elements are essential for providing a system that
reinforces space as the province for all humankind. If space is a province
for all humankind, it logically flows that a centralized body for resolving
disputes about space must be open and accessible to all parties in space.
While realistic space tourism and reasonable space access as a whole
are still in development, increases in private space ventures demand a
body accessible to private parties. 192 Similarly, if space is to be exploited
with any eye to preserving the interests and benefits of every country,
then the new body must permit equal access and input to both
spacefaring and nonspacefaring states. 193 Whatever methodology or
process is utilized to select judges or arbitrators, that process must be
inclusive of persons whose origins lay outside of the major spacefaring
states. The Outer Space Treaty endeavored to prevent discrimination
against states lacking the economic or technological ability to access
space by ensuring inclusion and collaboration in the shaping of space
law.194
B. Implementing the Global Space Organization
The issues plaguing the current regime for space adjudication
and governance might indicate a need for the creation of an entirely
new organization.19 5 Instead, this proposal suggests the modification of
a current body with a focus directed toward the preservation of the
fundamental principles of space law. Rather than engaging in the legal
procedures necessary to establish a new organization, the United
Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) and COPUOS should
be transformed into a three-pronged body of space regulation,
191.

United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space, U.N.
SPACE AFF., http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/index.html
[https://perma.cc/P93S-Z2BT] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
192.
See Michael Sheetz, Super Fast Travel Using Outer Space Could Be $20 Billion
Market, Disrupting Airlines, UBS Predicts, CNBC (Mar.
18, 2019, 2:50 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/18/ubs-space-travel-and-space-tourism-a-23-billion-business-in-adecade.html [https://perma.cc/XTT6-R76C].
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. I.
193.
194.
See id.
195.
See discussion supra Section I.A.3.
OFF.
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2020]

A CENTRAL FOR UMFOR SPACE-RELATED DISPUTES

657

adjudication, and collaboration.1 96 In doing so, the Global Space
Organization would act to preserve the ideals of a sovereignless,
collaboratively used province of humankind while working within the
existing international framework of the United Nations.
1. The Assembly
The Outer Space Treaty emphasized the collaborative nature of
space utilization with the intent of preserving the benefits and interests
of space for all countries.19 7 In an effort to encourage collaboration and
ensure international peace in space, the UN General Assembly (the
"Assembly") organized COPUOS, first as an ad hoc committee in 1958,
then as a permanent entity in 1959.198 The current committee,
consisting of representatives from ninety-five states, is tasked "with
reviewing international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space,
studying space-related activities that could be undertaken by the
United Nations, encouraging space research programmes, and studying
legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space." 199 Under
the newly consolidated regime, the committee would continue to
provide a platform for the international development of space law as a
forum for development and collaboration. 2 00 In order to continue to
uphold the fundamental principles, necessary improvements must be
made, including emphasizing an increase of membership 20 1 and
196.
See G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), International Co-Operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (Dec. 12, 1959) [hereinafter Permanent Committee]; G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), Question of the
Peaceful Use of Outer Space (Dec. 13, 1958) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Committee]; History, U.N. OFF.
FOR
OUTER
SPACE
AFF.,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/aboutus/history/index.html
[https://perma.cc/52RB-XD8H] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, arts. I-III.
197.
198.
See Permanent Committee, supra note 196; Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 196.
199.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE
AFF., http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html [https://perma.cc/95EH-ZRTM]
(last visited Jan. 21, 2020); Members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
U.N.

OFF.

FOR

OUTER

SPACE

AFF.,

http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/members/index.html

[https://perma.cc/RPG7-KWMB] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
200.
See Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 200.
201.
The current committees' ninety-five member state representatives are less than half
the current membership of the United Nations. For the space principles to truly be realized, and
for the benefits to spread to all countries, the new organization must push for stronger
membership. However, the current regime should be applauded for the inclusiveness of its
representative states as the primary spacefaring states are joined by many states with burgeoning
space programs. See Access to Space for All, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF.,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/access2space4all/index.html
[https://perma.cc/43D8XHYL] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020); Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Membership
Evolution,

U.N.

OFF.

FOR

OUTER

SPACE

AFF.,

http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/our-

work/copuos/members/evolution.html
[https://perma.cc/QAS3-Z369]
(last visited
2020); Growth in
United Nations Membership, 1945-Present, UNITED

Jan. 21,
NATIONS,
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potentially developing a restatement on current understanding of outer
space law. 20 2
2. Dispute Settlement
Perhaps the most significant change to the Global Space
Organization would be the development and implementation of a
system for dispute resolution. Although the current COPUOS
framework has a legal committee, it does not function as a resolving
body, focusing instead on the analysis of state action in space and the
implications of those actions within the treaty regime. 203 Under the new
system, the legal subcommittee would be converted into a judicial body
relying heavily on the existing system developed under the PCA's
Optional Rules. 204 Upon selecting a representative for the Assembly,
states would appoint an additional expert to serve a two-year term
among a pool of potential panelists. Upon the recognition of a dispute,
a three-expert panel would be assembled, with each of the involved
parties selecting an expert from the pool and a neutral third panelist
selected by the Assembly. Additionally, the Assembly would maintain
an additional pool of experts, five of which would be selected to serve as
an appeals body.
There is a multitude of difficulties for a system of this nature,
including the court's establishment, jurisdiction, and enforcement of its
decisions. The United Nations already has a principle judicial organ in
the ICJ, designed to resolve issues of international law; thus, the
establishment of a space-specific dispute resolution organ would
partially encroach ICJ's jurisdiction. 2 05 However, Article 7 of the UN
charter permits the establishment of necessary subsidiary organs,
allowing for the creation of this dispute resolution mechanism. 2 06
Although the lCJ charter permits the creation of a subject-specific

https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership- 1945-present/index.html#2000-Present [https://perma.cc/X3QA-WWHG] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
202.
In addition to its function as a platform for collaboration on space-related issues, the
current COPUOS has a legal subcommittee that meets annually to discuss the legal ramifications
of progress in regard to space exploration and use. While this proposal suggests the transformation
of that body into a system for dispute resolution, its current membership may also play a
significant part in drafting this restatement. See Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
and its Subcommittees, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF., http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/comm-subcomms.html [https://perma.cc/X5ZM-6LFE] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
203.
See id.
204.
See PCA OPTIONAL RULES, supra note 76, art. IX.
205.
U.N. Charter art. 7; see ICJ Statute, supra note 14, arts. 34, 36, ¶¶ 1-2.
206.
See U.N. Charter art. 7, ¶¶ 1-2.
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chamber, the restrictions embodied in the court's jurisdiction prevent
its use in compliance with the fundamental principles of space law. 2 07
In terms of jurisdiction, the dispute resolution mechanism must
be open to both public and private parties, regardless of state
representation within the new organization. While this could
potentially discourage membership in the organization, alternative
benefits, such as the ability to appoint a panelist to the pool, as well as
access to the information-sharing mechanisms, should encourage states
to commit to membership. The enforcement of organization resolutions
presents the largest hurdle to the effectiveness of the new regime, as it
has with many of the existing forums for resolution. Under the new
organization, represented states would be required to subject
themselves to the decisions of the body, as would any party bringing a
dispute before the panel. Assuming a representative state or private
party chose not to enforce the decision of the panel, the organization
would need to develop enforcement mechanisms. For the purpose of this
proposal, the organization might choose to cut off state access to the
information and research-sharing mechanisms that encourage the
global development of space activity.
3. Information and Research Services
In addition to the Assembly and the dispute resolution
mechanism, adherence to the fundamental principles of space law
demands a continuation of the information-sharing mechanisms
established in the Outer Space Treaty and its progeny. 208 Currently, the
information-sharing obligations established in the Outer Space Treaty
and the Registration Convention are maintained by UNOOSA, but
these would be transferred to the information-sharing and research
branch of the consolidated Global Space Organization. With the growth
in private space access and the decrease in space exploration costs,
space traffic will continue to rise, emphasizing the necessity of a central
reporting mechanism. 209 Additionally, the new branch would create a
repository of data to be used by states continuing to develop state and
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private space parties, encouraging the development of space access for
all countries. This repository and information-sharing system might
also encourage participation in the new organization as well as act as
an enforcement mechanism. 210
C. The Realities Facing a ConsolidatedOrganizationfor
Outer Space Affairs
While this proposal is an idealistic solution to the scattered
current space regime, it is important to note the feasibility of a
consolidated organization. Despite the increase in private space
expeditions, the field of space exploration and use is still dominated by
state action. As a result, the creation of international organizations like
the one suggested in this proposal will rely on the political whims of
states on a global scale. While space has provided a realm rich in
collaboration, the potential financial and resource gains of space may
eventually overwhelm an unconsolidated field of laws. 2 11 Indeed,
though clarity in the law and consistency in its application may
encourage future development, the ambiguity of the current regime
may provide states with the leeway to mold treaty interpretations
to benefit strong spacefaring states. Because the road to clarity in
space-related disputes and regulation has yet to provide a centralized
forum, the aim of this proposal is to aid in accelerating this process.
There is hope that with the increasing reality of space use and
exploitation, the current treaty regimes will be forced to adapt to the
rapid development in the field. 2 12
IV. CONCLUSION
Sixty years ago, the world stood captivated as global
superpowers engaged in a titanic struggle for global influence, a
struggle that would extend far beyond the surface of Earth. 2 13 As the
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Space Race ended, it created a void in the development of space law and
governance-a void that may now be filled with the progress of private
space enterprise. As private parties continue the development of space
exploration and exploitation, the space law regime must adapt to
ensure the fundamental principles set forth in the Outer Space Treaty
are preserved. 2 14 The progress of private parties, and the burdens that
come with it, require a consolidated system of governance and dispute
resolution that facilitate continuing development and use within the
confines of the current treaty regimes.
The current dispute resolution and governance systems
developed in an era where the exploration of space fell exclusively
within the purview of state activity, reflected by a lack of availability to
private parties. 2 15 Although multiple forums for resolving international
space disputes exist, each presents a series of weaknesses that fail to
align within the fundamental space principle framework. 216 However,
individual aspects of each of the existing forums provide the framework
from which a centralized space dispute resolution and governance body
may be developed. 217 The newly established body would enhance space
exploration and use by centralizing space governance, ensuring open
access to dispute resolution, and sharing developments and
information. Though continuing research and development may be
necessary to garner enough international appeal for such a body, the
continuing rise of private space exploration can no longer be ignored.
To preserve the fundamental principles of space law in the new era of
private space enterprise, the regime must change for the good of all
humankind.
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